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COMMENT
“REASONABLE SUSPICION PLUS”:
A FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS
CHIEF JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI’S
CONCERNS OF MASS
SURVEILLANCE WITHOUT
COMPROMISING POLICE
EFFECTIVENESS

TYLER R. SMITH *
And by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and
regulation under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of
constitutional regulation. 1

*
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California; B.A. Sociology, 2003, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. I would like to thank
my parents Ruth and Stephen for their boundless love and support. I am especially grateful to
Professor Wes Porter for his guidance throughout the writing process, and I credit him with the
“Plus” idea in this Comment. My friends Dan Blom and Brian Casido, as well as Professor Ed
Baskauskas did an excellent job of editing on a very tight schedule. And last, but not least, thank
you to all my good friends and professors at GGU for always inspiring me.
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
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INTRODUCTION
Global Positioning Systems 2 (GPS) provide law enforcement 3 with
a powerful tool to covertly investigate criminal networks. 4 These
networks, however, are often themselves technologically sophisticated
and thus able to elude police surveillance. 5 GPS monitoring has drawn
substantial criticism recently as police, in many jurisdictions, may utilize
the technology without a search warrant; the issue has boiled down to
whether the Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant in the first
place. 6

2

See generally 18 U.S.C.A. § 3117(b) (Westlaw 2011) (defining a mobile tracking device
as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object”). The United States Department of Defense began development of GPS in the mid-1970s.
The technology, which went into operation in 1995 under management of the United States Air
Force, utilizes satellite “constellations” to communicate “highly accurate, real-time, all weather”
information to military and civilian users. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING
SYSTEM
(GPS),
at
V-144
(1999),
available
at
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY1999/pdf/99gps.pdf (“DoD approved the NAVSTAR GPS
program in December 1973. Full-scale development began in June 1979.”).
3
Law enforcement agencies include federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as state and local law enforcement.
Although “law enforcement” and “police” are used interchangeably throughout this Comment,
“agent” is used to denote a DEA or FBI agent, whereas “officer” denotes a state or local police
officer. The distinction is important in order to accurately discuss facts of actual cases. For
simplicity, however, “officer(s)” and “police” will be used instead of “agent(s)” in any hypothetical
discussion or general analysis of the rules.
4
The court of appeals decisions that this Comment discusses each involved a fact pattern in
which the defendant was involved in either a drug manufacturing operation or drug trafficking
(supply) operation. These drug rings typically require vehicular movement, whether it be back and
forth to a marijuana grow site (or methamphetamine laboratory), or to transport the contraband from
one location to another. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 458 (N.D.N.Y.
2005) (discussing the difficulty of surveilling Hell’s Angels: “They frequently reside at locations
owned or rented by others, and use other people’s names to register vehicles and obtain utilities and
services, in an attempt to avoid identification by law enforcement. Jecko stated that Hell’s Angels
often reside in rural locations, where stationery surveillance could easily be detected. They monitor
police frequencies using scanners and use counter-surveillance techniques, such as periodically
photographing surrounding areas in order to discover law enforcement surveillance equipment such
as pole cameras.”); see also United States v. Dadanovic, No. 09-63-ART, 2010 WL 3620251, at *2
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010) (discussing how several suspects of a particular investigation lived in rural
areas so that officers following the suspects in a police car could have easily alerted the suspects).
5
See Frank J. Marine, The Threats Posed by Transnational Crimes and Organized Crime
Groups, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE COMBAT OF ORGANIZED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 25 (1999),
available at www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no54/no54.pdf (“[M]odern advanced
telecommunications and information systems that are used in legitimate . . . activity can also be used
by criminal networks to improve their own communication and to quickly carry out criminal
transactions . . . .”).
6
See United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that neither the
installation of the GPS device nor the subsequent monitoring violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights); United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss1/7

2

Smith: Reasonable Suspicion Plus

2011]

Reasonable Suspicion Plus

49

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
held in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, that police do not need a
warrant in order to utilize GPS devices in a criminal investigation. 7 In
his dissent to denial of rehearing en banc, 8 Chief Judge Alex Kozinski
fervently forewarned of the dangerous new precedent created by the
court’s decision: “The needs of law enforcement . . . are quickly making
personal privacy a distant memory. 1984 may have come a bit later than
predicted, but it’s here at last.” 9 But Nineteen Eighty-Four, 10 George
Orwell’s dystopian novel that prognosticates a police state where the
government—”Big Brother”—keeps a close watch over its citizens, is an
unfair comparison to the current reality of GPS monitoring.11
Nevertheless, for many immigrants to this country, including Judge
Kozinski, 12 living under a police state has been more reality than fiction,
and the admonition should not be ignored. This Comment addresses the
concern about “mass surveillance” with a proposed rule that would
require police, as a condition precedent, to articulate their reasonable

2010) (holding that attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle while parked in the suspect’s driveway
was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010)
(No. 10-7515); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the prolonged
surveillance aided by GPS technology was a search because it painted a detailed picture of the
suspect’s life), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259,
10A760); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating, in dictum, that had
the defendant not lacked standing to contest the matter, a search would still not be found to have
occurred when police used GPS to monitor a truck they believed was being used in a drug trafficking
operation); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that a search did not
take place when police used a GPS device to learn where their suspect had traveled).
7
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215.
8
En banc means, “With all judges present and participating; in full court.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 606 (9th ed. 2009). Because of its size, the Ninth Circuit ordinarily uses a limited en
banc court, consisting of the Chief Judge of the circuit plus ten additional judges drawn by lot from
the pool of active judges. Rarely, a case heard by a limited en banc court may be reheard by the full
court. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (Westlaw 2011); Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6,
92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (authorizing limited en banc courts for courts of appeals having more than
fifteen active judges).
9
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov.
10, 2010) (No. 10-7515).
10
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
11
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“[I]f such dragnet type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
12
Judge Kozinski was born in Communist Romania, where he lived until he was twelve.
Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2004), available at
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/feature_bazelon_janfeb04.msp; Pineda-Moreno
II, 617 F.3d at 1126 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“To those of us who have lived under a totalitarian
regime, there is an eerie feeling of déjà vu.”).
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suspicion and need for the device in a written declaration and to comply
with temporal and spatial limitations on use of the device.
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Knotts that a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police electronically
monitor his or her movements on public roads without a search
warrant. 13 The Court reasoned that when individuals travel on public
roads they “voluntarily convey[] [information about their travels] to
anyone who want[s] to look.” 14 Since the privacy protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment 15 cannot be applied when there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, 16 the Knotts Court held that the
monitoring that took place with a beeper device was constitutionally
valid. 17
Despite the Supreme Court’s seemingly unambiguous ruling
regarding warrantless 18 use of electronic tracking devices in Knotts,
today there is ardent disagreement about the constitutional limitations on
GPS monitoring. 19 In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit likened the
four-month-long GPS surveillance operation to the beeper monitoring
that had occurred in Knotts, and accordingly held that the warrantless
surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 20 In United States v.
Maynard, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia distinguished Knotts from the facts before it involving a

13

See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (holding that monitoring of a suspect’s movements on public
roads is “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment”).
14
Id. at 281-82 (“When [the suspect] travelled over the public streets he voluntarily
conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he
exited from public roads onto private property.”).
15
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
18
The semantic difference between “unwarranted” and “warrantless” is important to note:
“warrantless” refers to police actions conducted in the absence of a search warrant, whereas
“unwarranted” means unfounded.
19
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82; compare Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515), with United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos.
10-1259, 10A760).
20
Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (concluding that one does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when one travels on public thoroughfares), with Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d
at 1216 n.2 (“We, like the Seventh Circuit, believe that ‘[s]hould [the] government someday decide
to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide
whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.’”).
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twenty-eight-day surveillance operation.
“The intrusion such
[prolonged] monitoring makes into the subject’s private affairs stands in
stark contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts.” 21 The
evident circuit split prompted the United States Supreme Court to settle
the matter; 22 on November 8, 2011, the Court heard oral arguments in
United States v. Jones (formerly United States v. Maynard). 23
However, if the Court rules that GPS monitoring constitutes a per-se
search 24 —that is, that it requires a search warrant regardless of the
amount of time for which it is used 25 —then this powerful surveillance
tool would be sapped of its utility in many situations.26 The Justice
Department argued this important point in its petition to the Supreme
Court:
Although in some investigations the government could establish
probable cause and obtain a warrant before using a GPS device,
federal law enforcement agencies frequently use tracking devices early
in investigations, before suspicions have ripened into probable cause.
The court of appeals’ decision prevents law enforcement officers from
using GPS devices in an effort to gather information to establish

21

Compare Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85 (discussing the monitoring of a suspect’s movements
with a beeper device during a single journey), with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (discussing the
monitoring of a suspect’s movements with a GPS device continually over a twenty-eight-day
period).
22
See Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2010,
6:32 PM), www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/ (“What the Court is now
being asked to decide is, first, whether a GPS track is a ‘search,’ under the Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment, and when might the continuous monitoring of a track become an invalid search if
police do it without having a search warrant.”).
23
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, No. 10–1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8,
2011), available at www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf; see
Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/
(“Lawrence
Maynard’s
companion case did not raise the GPS issue; that was an issue for Antoine Jones in a consolidated
case. The government sought rehearing only as to Jones and the GPS question.”).
24
A “per-se search” means that regardless of the duration or the manner in which it is used,
GPS monitoring is a search for all purposes and thus requires a showing of probable cause before
any GPS monitoring can occur. For example, in Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564 n.6, the D.C. Circuit
stated that “[o]ne federal district court and two state courts have also held use of a GPS device is not
per se a search, but none was presented with the argument that prolonged use of a GPS device to
track an individual’s movements is meaningfully different from short-term surveillance.”
25
There are, concededly, instances where the probable cause requirement would not create
this dilemma for police. For example, in Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, the investigating officers did have
probable cause to believe that their suspects were involved in an intricate criminal drug conspiracy.
The validity of the monitoring was challenged because the search warrant they obtained in order to
utilize the GPS device expired after ten days, but the monitoring lasted for twenty-eight days.
26
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed
Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24.
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probable cause, which will seriously impede the government’s ability
to investigate leads and tips on drug trafficking, terrorism, and other
crimes. 27

It is imperative that the Court recognize these consequences of a per-se
ruling and articulate a prophylactic rule that delineates when, where, and
how police may use GPS without a search warrant. 28
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should establish a
new rule, “Reasonable Suspicion Plus,” that would require police to state
in a sworn declaration particularized reasoning for use of a GPS device,
but that would not require them to obtain a search warrant. The benefits
of the proposed rule would be threefold: (1) temporal and spatial
limitations would assure that GPS technology is utilized responsibly; (2)
the declaration would serve as a procedural obstacle requiring police to
show good cause for using the device; and (3) when the declaration is
registered with the district attorney’s office it would provide a tangible
record, facilitating judicial review if a defendant later contests the
legitimacy of the operation.
Part I examines the concept of “a reasonable expectation of privacy”
in the context of how the police use new technologies to monitor
suspects’ movements. Part II dissects the shortcomings of those
decisions but also points to valid considerations and concerns that arose
in those cases. Part III proposes a model rule that can serve as a
guidepost for appropriate use of GPS surveillance: “Reasonable
Suspicion Plus.” There are valid concerns on both sides of the
argument, 29 and the rule that this Comment proposes would address

27

See id.
See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but
when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s implication . . . that where
electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise would (that is, less than the
principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private action)—or that we should hedge our
bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opinions—is in my view indefensible.
The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”).
29
Proponents of GPS monitoring worry that if a warrant is required before police can utilize
the device, then their ability to use the device “before suspicions have ripened into probable cause”
will be diminished. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S.
filed Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24. Advocates of requiring a warrant for GPS
surveillance worry that without the procedural safeguards required by the Fourth Amendment, police
will arbitrarily use GPS technology. See Pineda-Moreno II, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We are taking a giant leap into the unknown, and the
consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible. Some day, soon, we may
wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 107515).
28
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those concerns, while maintaining constitutionality and deference to
Supreme Court precedent.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: FACTS AND ANALYSES

In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit examined
whether the attachment of a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle, which
was parked in the suspect’s driveway at the time, constituted a search. 30
The case involved Drug Enforcement Agency agents whose suspicions
were aroused upon observing a group of men purchasing a large quantity
of a particular fertilizer commonly used to help grow marijuana. 31
Without a search warrant, the agents went onto the driveway of one of
the suspects and attached a GPS device to the undercarriage of his
vehicle. 32 The subsequent GPS monitoring lasted four months. 33
Although the agents had also attached GPS devices while the Jeep
of the defendant had been parked on public streets, the court correctly
distinguished those instances from the attachment that took place in the
defendant’s driveway. 34 Surprisingly, 35 the government conceded that
the vehicle was parked within the curtilage 36 but nevertheless maintained

30

If these actions were a search, then the agents would not have been permitted to take such
actions in the absence of a warrant. Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2010),
petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515).
31
Id. at 1213.
32
Although the agents in Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1214, attached the devices “both
while [it] was parked in his driveway and while it was parked public areas, such as a street and a
public parking lot,” the Ninth Circuit was interested only in those instances where the agents had
attached the devices to the vehicle while it was parked in the driveway.
33
Id. at 1213.
34
See generally id. at 1215 (finding that the instances where the agents had attached the GPS
devices to the vehicle while it was parked on public streets to be an issue foreclosed by United States
v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999)).
35
See Orin Kerr, Petition for Certiorari Filed in Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit GPS
Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/22/petitionfor-certiorari-filed-in-pineda-moreno-ninth-circuit-gps-case/ (“The puzzling part about the panel
decision in Pineda-Moreno was that it essentially undid the government’s concession: It held that the
warrantless search was okay even though the driveway was concededly part of the curtilage. That’s
wrong, in my view. The government’s concession should have lost the case for them, and the Ninth
Circuit was wrong to bend over backwards to undo the concession.”).
36
In Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215, the Ninth Circuit noted that this concession had
been made earlier by the government before the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon.
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that the agents’ actions did not intrude upon the defendant’s
constitutionally protected privacy rights. 37
The curtilage of the home is the part of property that so immediately
surrounds the home that courts will afford it the same Fourth
Amendment protections as the home itself. 38 However, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the government’s assessment and held that despite the
agents’ entry upon the defendant’s curtilage to attach the device, there
was no invasion of privacy. 39 Since the defendant had not taken any
preventive measures to keep people away—his curtilage displayed no
“features to prevent someone standing in the street from seeing the entire
driveway”—he had effectively surrendered his privacy expectation with
respect to that area, according to the Ninth Circuit. 40 Likening the GPS
monitoring that took place over the subsequent months to that which
occurred with the beeper device in Knotts, the court quickly found the
matter to be foreclosed and upheld the conviction. 41
In a case with facts similar to Pineda-Moreno, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that “prolonged” 42 warrantless GPS surveillance violates the
Fourth Amendment. 43 In United States v. Maynard, officers believing
two men were involved in a drug-selling conspiracy attached a GPS
device to one of the men’s vehicles and monitored its movements
continually over a twenty-eight-day period. 44 The D.C. Circuit found
37

Id. at 1215 (“In sum, Pineda-Moreno cannot show that the agents invaded an area in which
he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when they walked up his driveway and attached the
tracking device to his vehicle. Because the agents did not invade such an area, they conducted no
search, and Pineda-Moreno can assert no Fourth Amendment violation.”).
38
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (“In this case, had a [government]
agent thought it useful to enter the [suspect’s] residence to verify that the [property] was actually in
the house and had he done so surreptitiously and without a warrant, there is little doubt that he would
have engaged in an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. For purposes
of the Amendment, the result is the same where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously
employs an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation
from outside the curtilage of the house.”).
39
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215 (“In sum, Pineda-Moreno cannot show that the agents
invaded an area in which he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy when they walked up his
driveway and attached the tracking device to his vehicle. Because the agents did not invade such an
area, they conducted no search, and Pineda-Moreno can assert no Fourth Amendment violation.”).
40
Id.
41
See generally id. at 1216-17 (“We conclude that the police did not conduct an
impermissible search of Pineda-Moreno’s car by monitoring its location with mobile tracking
devices.”).
42
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[P]rolonged GPS
monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have—short
perhaps of his spouse.”), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos.
10-1259, 10A760).
43
Id.
44
In Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555, the officers did, in fact, have probable cause to believe that
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that, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Knotts, 45 when data about
one’s movements is compiled over a prolonged period of time, the
aggregate of that information paints an “intimate” portrait of one’s life. 46
Since the GPS monitoring in Maynard lasted twenty-eight days, it
was, according to the D.C. Circuit, prolonged and consequently an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 47 The D.C. Circuit
reversed the conviction of the registered owner of the vehicle, Antoine
Jones. 48 In November 2011, the Justice Department argued the matter
before United States Supreme Court in United States v. Jones; 49 the
Court’s decision, it is hoped, will settle both Maynard and PinedaMoreno. 50
B.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: WHEN IT APPLIES AND WHEN A
VIOLATION IS EXCUSED
It is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement
agents must secure and use search warrants wherever reasonably
practicable. 51

Jones was involved in the operation and were issued a search warrant to use the GPS device to
monitor his movements in order to learn more about the criminal network in which he was involved.
Jones challenged the use of the device because the warrant had expired but police continued to use
the tracking device to collect evidence after its expiration.
45
Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983) (discussing the monitoring of
a suspect’s movements with a beeper device during a single journey), with Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563
(discussing the monitoring of a suspect’s movements with a GPS device continually over a twentyeight-day period).
46
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556.
47
Id. at 563.
48
Id.
49
Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. argued Nov. 8,
2011), available at www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
50
See United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (granting certiorari); Pineda-Moreno I,
591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515); see
also Lyle Denniston, Police and High-Tech Monitoring, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:32 PM),
www.scotusblog.com/2010/11/police-and-high-tech-monitoring/ (“What the Court is now being
asked to decide is, first, whether a GPS track is a ‘search,’ under the Constitution’s Fourth
Amendment, and when might the continuous monitoring of a track become an invalid search if
police do it without having a search warrant.”).
51
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (referring to searches and seizures
conducted incident to arrest), overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950).
Despite Trupiano being overruled by Rabinowitz, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), the Court
recognized the need to retain a variation of the “wherever reasonably practicable” principle that
Trupiano had articulated.
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The Fourth Amendment has long been a cherished keystone
buttressing our right to live free of the unwarranted prying eyes of the
government. 52 The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 53

In the context of GPS monitoring, whether the Fourth Amendment
applies should depend on where the device is attached and the duration
for which the monitoring lasts. 54 This section points to Court-created
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and instances in which the Court
has drawn a line and declared the amendment does not apply. 55

52

See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (“The Fourth Amendment gives
protection against unlawful searches and seizures . . . . Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a
limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and
the possession of his property . . . .”).
53
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54
See Brief for the United States at (I), United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed Aug.
11, 2011), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/previewbriefs/Other_
Brief_Updates/10-1259_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf (addressing both “[w]hether the warrantless
use of a GPS tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets
violated the Fourth Amendment [and w]hether the government violated respondent’s Fourth
Amendment rights by attaching the GPS tracking device to his vehicle without a valid warrant and
without his consent”); see generally Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986)
(“Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant
generalizations. ‘[W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy
constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.’”) (quoting United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 712 (1984)).
55
This Comment explores the landmark Supreme Court cases Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2419 (2011), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979), in which the Court established
exceptions to the general proscription against warrantless searches. This Comment also looks at
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, in which the Court refused to carve out an exception to the rule, and explains
how the rule from that case applies to the context of GPS monitoring. Throughout this Comment,
however, the holding from United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983), that people do not
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to public movements is not looked at as an
exception to the warrant requirement but rather as a helpful reminder of what exactly the Fourth
Amendment aims to protect. It provides a starting point that the Jones Court should be loath to
oversimplify as the D.C. Circuit did in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 10A760).
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The Limited Purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Policy-Based
Exceptions

A search or seizure occurs when a government agent intrudes upon
an individual’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.” 56 However, the right to be free from searches and seizures is
not absolute. 57 As Justice Harlan first explained in Katz v. United States,
one must maintain an actual expectation of privacy that society would
recognize as reasonable before the protections of the Fourth Amendment
While warrantless searches are presumptively
are triggered. 58
unreasonable, 59 and thus generally prohibited by the amendment, the
Supreme Court has recognized exceptions where the “societal costs of
obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or risk of loss or
destruction of evidence, [have] outweigh[ed] the reasons for prior
recourse to a neutral magistrate.” 60
The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment dictates that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon [a showing of] probable cause.” 61
Searches conducted in the absence of a warrant are per se
unreasonable. 62 If an officer conducts a warrantless search and needs to
use evidence procured by that search at trial in order to convict, then the
prosecutor must show that a recognized exception to the Fourth
Amendment justified the warrantless intrusion.63 If the government

56

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting only those searches deemed to be
unreasonably intrusive).
58
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (outlining the two-part test for
whether courts will apply the Fourth Amendment’s protections: whether the individual who is
challenging the government’s actions maintained an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
[if that] expectation [was] one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). When a
reviewing court finds that the individual’s expectation of privacy was in fact reasonable, the Fourth
Amendment requires that the government agent must have first obtained a search warrant before
interfering with the individual. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting only those
searches deemed to be unreasonably intrusive).
59
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has
observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval of
a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 759.
61
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 372 (1993) (“Time and again, this Court has observed that searches
and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval of a judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established
and well delineated exceptions.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63
See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970) (“[O]nly in ‘a few specifically established
and well-delineated’ situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitutional
57
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cannot meet this burden, the exclusionary rule precludes the evidence
from being admitted at trial. 64 Oftentimes, any other evidence collected
after the constitutional violation is also prohibited from being used to
prosecute the defendant. 65 An early violation of the Fourth Amendment
can thus prevent an otherwise sound criminal investigation from
proceeding to trial. 66
The exclusionary rule is a court-created remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations that aims to deter unjustified police intrusions. 67
Because of this design, the Court has recognized instances in which the
exclusion of evidence would not help deter similar future actions. 68 In
these few instances, the Court has created exceptions to the warrant
requirement. 69 Justice Rehnquist expressed this in Arizona v. Evans,
stating, “As with any remedial device, the rule’s application has been
restricted to those instances where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served. Where the exclusionary rule does not result in
appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use is unwarranted.” 70 The
notion of deterrence is thus inseparable from any Fourth Amendment
analysis. 71 In the context of GPS monitoring, the exclusionary rule

scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause to conduct it. The burden rests on the State
to show the existence of such an exceptional situation.”) (citation omitted).
64
See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
65
See id. at 391-92 (establishing what has come to be known as the “fruit of the poisonous
tree” concept).
66
See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988) (“The exclusionary rule prohibits
introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search and of testimony
concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search.”) (citation omitted); see generally
Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391-92 (1920) (establishing what has come to be known as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” concept).
67
See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) (“The exclusionary rule operates as a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment
rights through the rule’s general deterrent effect.”). But cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968)
(“The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups,
particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from
any criminal trial.”).
68
See, e.g., Evans, 514 U.S. 1; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1995) (“[T]he
practice of denying criminal defendants an exclusionary remedy from Fourth Amendment violations
when those errors occur despite the good faith of the Government actors does not require the
affirmance of petitioner’s conviction in this case. Finding the deterrent remedy of suppression not
compelled by the Fourth Amendment specifically relied on the ‘objectionable collateral consequence
of [the] interference with the criminal justice system’s truth-finding function’ in requiring a blanket
exclusionary remedy for all violations and the relative ineffectiveness of such remedy to deter future
Fourth Amendment violations in particular cases.”) (citations omitted).
69
See, e.g., Evans, 514 U.S. 1; Ryder, 515 U.S. at 185-86.
70
Evans, 514 U.S. at 11.
71
See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary]
rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee
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should be used to prevent only those government actions that are
unreasonable. 72
The Supreme Court has established exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment by balancing the restrictions of the amendment against
policy concerns such as police officer safety and the practicalities of law
enforcement. 73 The single-purpose-container rule was established in
Arkansas v. Sanders as an adjunct to the plain-view doctrine. 74 If an
officer can infer the contents of a container based on its outward
appearance, then the contents, like the container itself, are said to be in
plain view, and the defendant is said to have forfeited his or her
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the container and its
contents. 75 Accordingly, an officer in such a situation does not need a
search warrant in order to search or seize the container. 76
In Chimel v. California, 77 the Court established the search-incidentto-arrest doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement primarily in
reaction to concerns about officer safety. 78 The search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine permits officers to conduct warrantless searches provided they
are conducted incident, in both time and place, to the arrest. 79 The

of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures: ‘The rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”) (quoting Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
72
But cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“This case does not
require us to, and therefore we do not, decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual
surveillance would be a search subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”), cert.
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 10A760).
73
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (excusing a search and seizure if the
place searched might contain destructible evidence or a weapon and it was within the lunging
distance of the arrestee), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (justifying a warrantless, but brief, stop and pat down for weapons provided
the officer had reasonable suspicion that the individual was involved in criminal activity).
74
The Court explained in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981), that a container
can make its contents obvious to an observer by its distinctive configuration or otherwise.
75
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979).
76
In the footnote credited with formally establishing the rule, Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13,
the Court provided two examples of single-purpose containers: a burglary kit and a gun case. “Thus,
some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support
any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to ‘plain view,’ thereby
obviating the need for a warrant.” Id.
77
Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
78
See id. at 762-63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order
to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated.”).
79
Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
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rationale of the rule is to protect officers from arrestees who might, out
of desperation, lunge for a weapon to effect their escape. 80 Despite the
persistence of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine from Chimel, the rule
leaves police with little practical guidance; 81 an officer cannot truly
know whether constitutional boundaries have been crossed until a judge
later makes the determination. 82 Nevertheless, exceptions to the warrant
requirement generally require that the scope of the intrusion be limited to
the need. 83
The public’s right to be free from unnecessary intrusions is best met
with carefully drawn preconditions. 84 In Arizona v. Gant, Justice
Stevens stated, “That limitation, which continues to define the
boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to
arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting
officers . . . .” 85 The Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that “[t]he
Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of
governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation.” 86
Terry reflected the Court’s belief that a prophylactic rule that retains the
traditional reasonableness standard is important in order for the
exception to serve as a helpful guideline for police. 87 In the context of

80

Id.
A motion to suppress is granted when the search is not proximate in time and place to the
arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he search of [the
defendant’s] car was characterized by neither the spatial nor the temporal proximity to the place and
time of the arrest required to constitute a valid search incident to arrest.”); United States v. Johnson,
16 F.3d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding the defendant’s briefcase was not seized incident to the arrest
because it was not in the area of his immediate control at the time of arrest).
82
See Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing
Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (“As with a police
officer’s (or magistrate’s) before-the-fact assessment of the legality of a planned search, it is not ex
post reality (that the defendant was or was not committing a crime or hiding evidence of crime) that
determines the substantive outcome of the suppression motion; it is the ex ante perspective of the
officer. If the officer did not reasonably expect to find evidence, then the evidence that she did in
fact find should be suppressed at trial.”); see generally Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment doctrine, moreover, is circular,
for someone can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held
that a search in that area would be unreasonable.”).
83
See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“Thus, evidence may not be
introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related
in scope to the justification for their initiation.”).
84
See generally Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“When this Court
creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the
weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs.”).
85
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
86
Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29.
87
See id. at 31 (Harlan J., concurring) (“[W]hat is said by this Court today will serve as
initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities and courts throughout the land as this important
81
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GPS monitoring, that wisdom should endure, since spatial and temporal
limitations could easily be identified in a new rule. 88
2.

Reasonable Suspicion: A Practical Standard

When an investigation is in its early stages, it would be prudent to
allow police to take minimally intrusive yet proactive steps to
corroborate their suspicions rather than requiring that they demonstrate
probable cause 89 sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant. 90 In
Terry, the Supreme Court analyzed whether an officer’s actions of
stopping and frisking two men after observing their suspicious behavior
outside a storefront window violated their Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 91 The need for the officer
to take preventive measures was plain, and the Terry Court recognized
the dilemma the probable cause requirement could create. 92 Although
the officer’s observations hardly amounted to probable cause, the Court
held that the officer’s actions of detaining the men and patting them
down for weapons—actions that would ordinarily be considered a search
triggering the warrant requirement—were nonetheless justified. 93 If an
officer were to be prohibited from searching a suspicious individual who
the officer suspected—but lacked probable cause to believe—was about
new field of law develops.”).
88
GPS monitoring, like a search incident to arrest, involves both temporal parameters
(“prolonged surveillance”) and spatial parameters (attachment of a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle
while it is parked in his or her curtilage). See generally City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2629,
2635 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s
implication . . . that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than we otherwise
would (that is, less than the principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide private action)—
or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opinions—
is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”).
89
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949), the Supreme Court attempted
to define probable cause: “[Probable cause] mean[s] more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists
where ‘the facts and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.” (citing Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
90
See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
91
Id. at 6. The officer in Terry observed the men alternately walk back and forth past a
storefront, peering in through the windows, appearing to scope the store out for a robbery.
92
See id. at 20 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”).
93
Id. at 21 (“And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
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to commit a crime, then the officer might be left with no other option but
to wait until actual criminal behavior began. 94 In such a situation, the
warrant requirement is both impractical and runs counter to the public’s
interest in law enforcement. 95
The Court’s solution to the dilemma was to lower the prerequisite
probable cause standard to a less-stringent one of “reasonable
suspicion.” 96 Under Terry, if an officer reasonably suspects an
individual of wrongdoing, based on specific and articulable facts, 97 then
the officer can temporarily detain that person and pat him or her down
for weapons. 98 A Terry stop is thus a warrantless but founded
investigation that is constitutionally permissible in the interest of
proactive police work. 99
3.

A Balancing Test to Meet Constitutional Requirements

The Terry Court derived its authority to create the new reasonablesuspicion standard from an earlier Supreme Court decision, Camara v.
Municipal Court. 100 In Camara, the Court used a balancing approach to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment in a matter involving health
inspectors and their need to enter and inspect residences without
warrants. 101 These particular intrusions, the Court noted, were justified
only because the harm caused was minimal when compared to the need
for city officials to conduct these health inspections in the absence of
search warrants. 102
94

See id. at 35 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Police officers need not wait until they see a
person actually commit a crime before they are able to ‘seize’ that person.”).
95
Id. at 15 (majority opinion) (“Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a
high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.”).
96
Id.; accord Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“We have described
reasonable suspicion simply as a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person
stopped of criminal activity and probable cause to search as existing where the known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found.”) (citation omitted).
97
An officer’s reasonable suspicion may not be based simply on a hunch or predicated on
behavior like nervousness. “And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light
of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (involving the right of city health
inspectors to make warrantless inspections of home).
101
Id.
102
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional
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The balancing test is fundamentally a sliding scale of
reasonableness. 103 “[T]he Supreme Court indicated that the level of
cause required for such inspections could be determined only by
balancing the need to search against the scope of the invasion.” 104 If an
officer’s actions are unnecessarily invasive, and that invasion is not
offset by a greater government need, 105 then the search or seizure is
unreasonable and, consequently, cannot be justified in the absence of a
warrant. 106 If, on the other hand, there exists a compelling need to
investigate, and the officer’s actions intrude only to the extent necessary
to corroborate his or her suspicions, then a court will find those actions
reasonable. 107
Despite these Fourth Amendment caveats, the Supreme Court
decisions all reflect instances where particular needs outweighed threats
to the protected interests. 108 In Chimel, the need for officer safety 109
prompted the Court to construct the search-incident-to-arrest
exception. 110 And in Terry, the lower reasonable-suspicion standard was
justified by the requirement that the intrusion be limited. 111 The Court
recognized that the all-or-nothing implications of the probable cause

responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must
be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”).
103
See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 977, 1011 (2004) (“[T]he balancing test [from Camara] has devolved into an assessment of
the relative strength of the governmental and individual interests, with the Court’s thumb pressing
heavily on the government’s side of the scale.” (footnote omitted)).
104
JOSEPH D. GRANO & LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 28
(4th ed. 2004).
105
The limitations upon the scope are a malleable border proportionate to an officer’s need.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional responsibility to
guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal
security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires. When such
conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from
evidence in criminal trials.”).
106
See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009) (“When this Court creates a
prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the weighing of
the rule’s benefits against its costs.”).
107
See id. (“When this Court creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional
right, the relevant ‘reasoning’ is the weighing of the rule’s benefits against its costs.”).
108
See id.
109
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated by Davis v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2419 (2011), the Court also considered the need for officers to be able to prevent arrestees from
destroying evidence.
110
Id.
111
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Modern Technologies Compounding Traditional Problems

In the rapidly evolving world of modern technology, the Fourth
Amendment becomes vulnerable to the subjective whims and knowledge
of the presiding judge. 113 The Supreme Court has, nevertheless,
continued to apply Justice Harlan’s reasonableness test 114 to newly
developed technology utilized in surveillance operations. 115 In Knotts,
officers used a beeper device to monitor their suspect’s vehicular
movements, eventually pinpointing the clandestine location of the
suspect’s drug lab. 116 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated,
“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”117
The Court thus held that the use of the beeper device did not intrude
upon the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights, since the technology did
not raise any “constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not
also raise.” 118
In United States v. Karo, the Court drew another bright line with
respect to technology and the Fourth Amendment. 119 This decision,
however, underscored the principle that the home—and the area

112

See generally id.
The problem is that the test is “largely circular: a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy when the courts decide to protect it through the Fourth Amendment. . . . [I]n a high-tech
world, a judge must ruminate over the importance of privacy and the meaning of ‘reasonableness.’”
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808-09 (2004) (citing Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2001).
114
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
115
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal
imaging device to detect the temperature inside a home defeats the occupant’s reasonable
expectation of privacy); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding that police use of
an airplane to view marijuana plants in defendant’s backyard from 1,000 feet overhead was not a
search under the Fourth amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (evaluating an
electronic monitoring device to reveal details about the interior of a suspect’s home); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (evaluating the use of an electronic beeper device to monitor
movement on public roadways).
116
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276.
117
Id. at 282.
118
Id. at 285.
119
See Karo, 468 U.S. 705.
113
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immediately surrounding it—deserves the utmost Fourth Amendment
protection. 120 In Karo, officers placed a tracking device inside a can of
ether as part of their investigation. 121 When the suspect carried the can
into his home, the device transmitted information about the interior of the
residence. 122 The Court found this kind of surveillance to be an
unreasonable intrusion because “the Government surreptitiously
employ[ed] an electronic device to obtain information that it could not
have obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.” 123
With respect to tracking devices, one of the constitutional limitations is
the border of the curtilage. 124
What remains unclear, however, is whether going onto the curtilage
to install a tracking device is constitutionally valid when officers can see
the area from beyond the curtilage. 125 In Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth
Circuit held that these actions do not automatically violate the Fourth
Amendment. 126 Also unclear is how the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Maynard can be reconciled with the long-held understanding that one
does not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to
one’s movement on public thoroughfares. 127 Since 2007, five federal

120

See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat
emanating from the home was a search because it was not something that could be done by ordinary
human senses and because the technology was not in general use). But see United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular
reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the
area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is
put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.”).
121
Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
122
Id. at 727.
123
Id. at 715.
124
Id. But see Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 (“[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be
resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to
the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
by people passing by.”).
125
Compare United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno I), 591 F.3d 1212, 1214-15
(9th Cir. 2010) (holding that attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle while parked within the
curtilage was not a violation of his Fourth amendment rights in part because “the driveway had
no . . . features to prevent someone standing in the street from seeing the entire driveway”), petition
for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515), with Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (concluding that the
officers actions were constitutionally impermissible because they learned information with the
tracking device that they otherwise could not have from beyond the curtilage).
126
Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215, 1217.
127
Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10-1259, 10A760), with United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that monitoring of a suspect’s movements on public roads
is “neither a ‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
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courts of appeals 128 have addressed the issue of GPS surveillance, yet no
uniform principle has emerged. 129 But although the Ninth and D.C.
Circuit cases involved curious analyses that contorted traditional
understandings of how surveillance technology interacts with the Fourth
Amendment, 130 the rift can and should be mended with a blend of
pertinent Supreme Court precedent. 131
II.

ANALYSIS

In 1983, when “the world [was] explosive and hence, more difficult
and unfavorable” 132 than it had been since World War II, the Supreme
Court held that the possibility of mass surveillance was insufficient
reason to require police to obtain search warrants before monitoring a
suspect with an electronic device. 133 The idea of using the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to prevent a police state

128

See United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 2011); Pineda-Moreno I, 591
F.3d 1212; Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
129
See Hernandez, 647 F.3d at 219 (concluding that neither the installation of the GPS device
nor the subsequent monitoring violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); Pineda-Moreno
I, 591 F.3d at 1215, 1217 (holding that attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle while parked in the
suspect’s driveway was not a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights); Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558
(holding that the prolonged surveillance aided by GPS technology was a search because it painted a
detailed picture of the suspect’s life); Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (stating, in dictum, that had the
defendant not lacked standing to contest the matter, a search would still not be found to have
occurred when police used GPS to monitor a truck they believed was being used in a drug trafficking
operation); Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (holding that a search did not take place when police used a
GPS device to learn where their suspect had traveled to).
130
See Pineda-Moreno I, 591 F.3d at 1215; United States v. Jones, No. 08-3034, slip op. at 4
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 2010) (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The
reasonable expectation of privacy as to a person’s movements on the highway is, as concluded in
Knotts, zero. The sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.”).
131
The “Reasonable Suspicion Plus” rule that this Comment proposes would restore the more
traditional understanding of the curtilage from United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987)
(noting that under common law, the curtilage is afforded the same sacrosanct Fourth Amendment
protection as the home itself), and would apply the reasonable-suspicion standard from Terry to
permit limited intrusions. Moreover, if the Court identifies the point at which a GPS monitoring
lasts an unreasonable period of time, the Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, decision could be respected without
expressly discounting the D.C. Circuit’s concern about prolonged surveillance.
132
“Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades was the situation in the world as explosive and
hence, more difficult and unfavorable, as in the first half of the 1980s.” Benjamin B. Fischer, A Cold
War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, (Jul. 7, 2008,
11:28 AM), www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-andmonographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm (quoting Mikhail Gorbachev, Feb. 1986).
133
See generally Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284 (“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices
as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
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reminiscent of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four 134 from becoming
a reality seems prudent. 135 But just as every motion to suppress must be
based upon the particular facts of the case, so too should the Supreme
Court evaluate GPS monitoring cautiously, with an eye toward what is
actually occurring, not what could potentially occur. 136 The current
Court should recognize the Cold War context of Knotts and be wary of
agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that the era of “dragnet type” mass
surveillance is indeed upon us. 137
When the Court agreed to review United States v. Jones on June 27,
2011, it posed an additional question to be addressed at oral argument,
one that the D.C. Circuit had not asked: “Whether the government
violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights by installing the GPS
tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his
consent.” 138 The Court likely posed this question so that it may address
what the D.C. Circuit did not: the point in time at which a search goes
from the “relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts” 139 to an
unreasonable intrusion that requires a search warrant. 140
To resolve this question, the Court cannot simply conclude that GPS
monitoring is or is not a search. If the Court concludes that GPS
monitoring is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, liberal minds
would rightly fear further deterioration of the amendment, 141 and
134

GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We are taking a giant leap into
the unknown, and the consequences for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible.
Some day, soon, we may wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.”), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515).
136
See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) (“Fourth Amendment
cases must be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant generalizations. ‘[W]e have
never held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment.’”) (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 712).
137
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82 (“[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether
different constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
138
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10–1259, 10A760).
139
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
140
For analysis of what the Court’s intent might have been in posing this question, see Orin
Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jun. 27, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supreme-court-agrees-toreview-case-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendment/.
141
See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno (Pineda-Moreno II), 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.
2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“I concur in Chief Judge
Kozinski’s dissent. I have served on this court for nearly three decades. I regret that over that time
the courts have gradually but deliberately reduced the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the
point at which it scarcely resembles the robust guarantor of our constitutional rights we knew when I
135
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unchecked “dragnet type” mass surveillance might become an all-tooreal concern. On the other hand, if the Court distinguishes Jones from
Knotts in order to say GPS monitoring is a per-se search, law
enforcement throughout the country could be deprived of the essential
surveillance tool when it may be needed most: the early stages of an
investigation. 142 Either way, legitimate public policy concerns would
ferment. Requiring police to show “Reasonable Suspicion Plus” would
prevent police from using GPS technology in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
A.

THE DILEMMA CREATED BY REQUIRING PROBABLE CAUSE

The principle objective of most surveillance operations is to gather
evidence amounting to probable cause sufficient to obtain a search or
arrest warrant. 143 If an officer cannot state with any particularity the
location of the intended search, it is unlikely that a warrant will be
issued. 144 With GPS, the information (i.e., location) needed for the
affidavit is the very information the officer seeks to learn from the
device. 145 In its petition for certiorari, the Department of Justice
explained the problematic implications of Maynard:
[T]he court of appeals’ opinion gives no guidance to law enforcement
officers about when a warrant is required. Use of a GPS device for a
few hours (or perhaps a few days) is presumably still acceptable under
Knotts. But the court’s opinion offers no workable standard for law
enforcement officers to determine how long a GPS device must
remain in place before their investigation reveals enough information
to offend a reasonable expectation of privacy (and therefore become a
Fourth Amendment search). 146

joined the bench. . . . Today’s decision is but one more step down the gloomy path the current
Judiciary has chosen to follow with regard to the liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Sadly, I predict that there will be many more such decisions to come. I dissent.”) (paragraph breaks
and citations omitted), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 10, 2010) (No. 10-7515).
142
Res judicata is “[a]n issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision.” The
Latin phrase translates to “a thing adjudicated.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (9th ed. 2009).
143
See generally Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
144
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring a “particular[] descri[ption] [of] the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”); accord Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 213 (1981) (“A search warrant, in contrast[,] is issued upon a showing of probable cause to
believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a particular place . . . .”).
145
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24–25, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S.
filed Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24-25.
146
Id.
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When the Supreme Court decides Jones, 147 it should take heed of this
point and provide practical parameters as to how long GPS monitoring
may last before it becomes prolonged. 148 The discord amongst the
circuits shows the need for Supreme Court clarification. However,
overly simplified clarification (e.g., GPS monitoring automatically
violates the Fourth Amendment) 149 would ignore the possibility that GPS
monitoring can be limited in such a way as not to infringe upon a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 150
B.

A SOLUTION FOR A CONVOLUTED MATTER

Requiring officers to articulate their reasonable suspicion in a
written declaration before they are permitted to use GPS would help
prevent unfettered abuse of the technology. 151 A lower standard than
probable cause, such as reasonable suspicion, would maintain
constitutionality, provided the officers’ actions are not overly intrusive,
and permit officers to perform the essential functions of their duty.152
The Terry Court applied the reasonable-suspicion standard because the
logistics of the warrant requirement in the context of that case ran

147

United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011) (Nos. 10–1259, 10A760). The D.C. Circuit upheld the
conviction of Lawrence Maynard but reversed the conviction of Antoine Jones. Because the
Department of Justice only petitioned the Supreme Court for review the reversal of Jones’s
conviction, the name of the case changed.
148
See Brief for the United States at (I), United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed Aug.
11, 2011), 2011 WL 3561881 at *I (addressing both “[w]hether the warrantless use of a GPS
tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the
Fourth Amendment [and w]hether the government violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights
by attaching the GPS tracking device to his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his
consent”).
149
See generally Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 n.6 (“One federal district court and two state
courts have . . . held use of a GPS device is not per se a search, but none was presented with the
argument that prolonged use of a GPS device to track an individual’s movements is meaningfully
different from short-term surveillance.”) (citing United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 467-68
(N.D.N.Y. 2005); State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009); Stone v. State, 941 A.2d
1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)).
150
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566-67.
151
See generally Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion
and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (“As with
a police officer’s (or magistrate’s) before-the-fact assessment of the legality of a planned search, it is
not ex post reality (that the defendant was or was not committing a crime or hiding evidence of
crime) that determines the substantive outcome of the suppression motion; it is the ex ante
perspective of the officer. If the officer did not reasonably expect to find evidence, then the
evidence that she did in fact find should be suppressed at trial.”).
152
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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counter to public policy. 153 The logistical policy considerations of GPS
monitoring are similar to those in Terry in that law enforcement
personnel should be permitted to safely corroborate, through minimally
intrusive investigation, 154 suspected criminal activity.
The Supreme Court should adopt guidelines that would allow GPS
devices to be used for defined periods of time before the warrantless
monitoring must be discontinued.
The Court has previously
demonstrated its willingness to draw bright-line temporal limitations on
criminal procedure matters, and such a bright-line limitation in this
context would alleviate the D.C. Circuit’s concern about prolonged GPS
surveillance. 155 Despite that concern, the D.C. Circuit expressly refused
to specify the point at which the surveillance became prolonged.156
When the Supreme Court granted the Justice Department’s request for
review, and asked “[w]hether the government violated respondent’s
Fourth Amendment rights by installing the GPS tracking device on his
vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent,” 157 it indicated
its discomfort with the all-or-nothing implications of the D.C. Circuit’s
holding. 158 The concern that prolonged GPS surveillance may be
unconstitutional by virtue of its duration and intensity, however, is

153

Id. at 20 (1968) (“But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.”).
154
The rule from Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, rested on the presumption that “[t]he scope of the
search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible.” (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). This
Comment proposes a rule with express limitations on the scope of a warrantless GPS investigation,
but these limitations proceed under the presumption that utilization of the device is permissible ab
initio.
155
See generally Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. This Comment proposes a limitation on the
number of days for which GPS could be used without a warrant. In Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, the D.C.
Circuit noted that the police had actually obtained a GPS search warrant, but that it had expired after
ten days. The Supreme Court recently set a fourteen-day limitation to an issue involving Miranda
rights. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (“The 14–day limitation meets [the
defendant]’s concern that a break-in-custody rule lends itself to police abuse.”).
156
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566 (“This case does not require us to, and therefore we do not,
decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual surveillance would be a search subject to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).
157
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064, 3064 (2011).
158
See Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Agrees to Review Case on GPS and the Fourth Amendment,
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 27, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/27/supremecourt-agrees-to-review-case-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendment/ (discussing what the Court intended
by posing this question).
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legitimate, 159 and the Court should adopt a rule that addresses this
concern.
The Ninth Circuit, in Pineda-Moreno, was correct to evaluate the
curtilage issue, but its decision departed from traditional understandings
of that constitutionally protected area of the home. 160 Regardless,
entering onto a suspect’s driveway in order to attach a GPS device is the
kind of unnecessary constitutional risk that could be avoided. When it
appears to an officer that a suspect’s vehicle may be parked within the
curtilage, he or she should wait for the vehicle to be parked in a public
area. 161 Instead of viewing this as a hindrance to their surveillance
operations, law enforcement should favor a bright-line rule that would
help avoid the exclusionary rule’s crippling effect—dismissal of the
charges against a defendant.
III. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT NEW STANDARDS: REASONABLE
SUSPICION PLUS AND TEMPORAL LIMITS
The proposed rule begins with the premise that an officer has
observed someone’s activities that led the officer to reasonably suspect
that the individual is involved in criminal activity. That the level of
suspicion might not rise to the higher level of probable cause, however,
would not preclude the officer from using a GPS device to facilitate the
investigation. However, at the outset of the investigation, the officer
would be required to set forth an investigative need—in a written
declaration under penalty of perjury 162 —articulating both what those
159

Maynard, 615 F.3d 544; accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 (“[A] search which is reasonable at
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.”).
160
See Orin Kerr, Petition for Certiorari Filed in Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit GPS
Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/11/22/petitionfor-certiorari-filed-in-pineda-moreno-ninth-circuit-gps-case/ (“The puzzling part about the panel
decision in Pineda-Moreno was that it essentially undid the government’s concession: It held that the
warrantless search was okay even though the driveway was concededly part of the curtilage. That’s
wrong, in my view. The government’s concession should have lost the case for them, and the Ninth
Circuit was wrong to bend over backwards to undo the concession.”).
161
This Comment does not address issues of standing. For instance, if an officer knows that a
suspect’s vehicle is parked in the curtilage of someone else’s home, the suspect at trial would not be
able to contest the officer’s intrusion since it was not upon his own curtilage. For detailed analysis
of standing in this context, see Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment
Exclusion and Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (2007).
162
“Unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury” are described in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1746
(Westlaw 2011):
Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or
requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is required or permitted to be supported,
evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration, verification, certificate,
statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same (other than a
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suspicions are based upon and why utilizing GPS would be more
Requiring this written
beneficial than traditional approaches. 163
declaration is the “plus” condition precedent aimed at preventing
arbitrary, and hence unreasonable, intrusions. It would furthermore
increase judicial economy by providing a tangible record that would be
admissible at any suppression motion. If an officer can in good faith164
attest to his or her investigative need for GPS technology and articulate
specific factors and observations amounting to reasonable suspicion, then
the limited utilization of GPS monitoring would be presumptively
constitutional. 165
Disallowing the attachment of GPS devices to vehicles parked on,
or to vehicles that reasonably appear to be parked on, the curtilage of a
suspect’s home would serve as a bright line for officers. 166 This
restriction would prevent officers from trampling the Fourth Amendment
by ensuring that they do not cross the constitutional boundary protecting
deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified official
other than a notary public), such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported,
evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn declaration, certificate, verification, or
statement, in writing of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under penalty of
perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form:
(1) If executed without the United States: “I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under
penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is
true and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)”.
(2) If executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths:
“I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct. Executed on (date).
(Signature)”.
163

The proposed “Reasonable Suspicion Plus” rule could borrow language from 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2518(c) (Westlaw 2011), which provides that, when applying for a warrant to employ electronic
surveillance, the affiant should clearly state “whether or not other investigative procedures have been
tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous.”
164
Each enumeration of the rule is intended to incorporate the good-faith requirement; the
officer must subjectively believe the facts he or she writes on the declaration amount to reasonable
suspicion in each section of the rule.
165
See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (necessitating that reasonable suspicion
be specific and articulable).
166
See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness,
2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1026-27 (2004) (“[A]bsent objective criteria for measuring reasonableness,
progressively intrusive actions have been and will continue to be allowed. This tendency is
fundamentally inconsistent with the framers’ intent to protect individuals from unreasonable
governmental intrusions. To avoid undermining that fundamental purpose, government officials need
objective criteria to measure reasonableness. Justice Frankfurter was correct when he observed: ‘To
say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is no guide at all
either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an ‘unreasonable search’ is forbidden—
that the search must be reasonable.’”).
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the home. 167 In conjunction with this spatial limitation, the new rule
would also restrict the duration of GPS use to a reasonable period of
time.
The written declaration, the “plus” aspect, would inquire into the
legitimacy of the officer’s purpose by requiring that he or she attest to
four aspects of the proposed investigation. These “Reasonable Suspicion
Plus” declarations might resemble the following:
1. The officer seeking to utilize a GPS monitoring device explains
what led to his or her reasonable suspicion that a particular subject has
recently engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in criminal
activity.
2. The officer articulates how monitoring the suspect’s vehicular
movement and location would further the investigation or corroborate
the suspicion.
3. The officer explains why employing a GPS monitoring device in
this situation is superior, not just preferable, to traditional surveillance
tactics.
4. The officer attests that he or she will attach and activate the GPS
device within ten days of submitting this declaration to the prosecuting
168
and that the device will be
attorney for the relevant jurisdiction,
manually or automatically deactivated no later than fourteen days after
the device is activated.

The first aspect of the declaration would require the officer to
express, in specific terms, what type of crime he or she suspects the
subject is involved in. Simply stating, however, that the officer suspects
an individual of “illicit drug activity” would be insufficient because it is
too vague; drug activity could mean drug use, manufacture, distribution,
or simply association with known drug users. If, on the other hand, the
suspected criminal activity is the “manufacture of illicit drugs” or
“trafficking in illegal drugs,” that could suffice because of its greater
167

See generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“These factors are useful
analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant
consideration—whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
168
In its petition for certiorari in Jones, the Justice Department recognized that “[t]he warrant
authorized the agents to install the device on the Jeep within ten days of the issuance of the warrant
and only within the District of Columbia, but the agents did not install the device until 11 days after
the warrant was issued.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259
(U.S. filed Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *3.
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specificity, but the matter would still depend on the accompanying facts
that the officer presents.
The second aspect goes to the officer’s investigatory need for a GPS
device. There should be a sufficient nexus between the officer’s need for
the device and the suspected criminal activity. 169 For example, it would
not be permissible for the officer to state a suspicion that the subject is
“using an illicit drug” if later in the declaration the officer’s reason for
requesting GPS is that he or she wants to learn where a drug lab may be
located. The relationship between suspected drug use and the officer’s
need for a GPS device would be too attenuated, as tracking a suspected
drug user’s movements is unlikely to reveal a clandestine site where the
drug use occurs. In this regard, the declaration should be consistent
throughout: the means (GPS monitoring) should correlate with the ends
(the need to covertly learn of a suspect’s whereabouts or movements).
The third aspect aims to limit utilization of GPS to aiding those
investigations for which it is clearly needed. The prevalence of
sophisticated and heavily financed criminal networks necessitates that
law enforcement agencies have access to GPS technology. 170 When
surveillance operations involve clever and powerful cartels or violent
subjects, GPS would provide a tactical advantage for the police by
allowing them to monitor their subjects from a safe distance. 171
The fourth factor addresses the issue of prolonged surveillance and
would make the officer aware of the bright-line limitation. Any
information gathered after the deactivation date should be subject to

169

See generally United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999) (“A warrant
application must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been committed—the
‘commission’ element, and (2) enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the place to be
searched—the so-called ‘nexus’ element.”).
170
Frank J. Marine, The Threats Posed by Transnational Crimes and Organized Crime
Groups, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE COMBAT OF ORGANIZED TRANSNATIONAL CRIME 25 (1999),
available at www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/no54/no54.pdf (“[M]odern advanced
telecommunications and information systems that are used in legitimate . . . activity can also be used
by criminal networks to improve their own communication and to quickly carry out criminal
transactions . . . .”).
171
See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 458 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing
the difficulty of surveilling Hell’s Angels: “They frequently reside at locations owned or rented by
others, and use other people’s names to register vehicles and obtain utilities and services, in an
attempt to avoid identification by law enforcement. Jecko stated that Hell’s Angels often reside in
rural locations, where stationery surveillance could easily be detected. They monitor police
frequencies using scanners and use counter-surveillance techniques, such as periodically
photographing surrounding areas in order to discover law enforcement surveillance equipment such
as pole cameras.”); see also United States v. Dadanovic, No. 09-63-ART, 2010 WL 3620251, at *2
(E.D. Ky. Sept. 10, 2010) (discussing how several suspects of a particular investigation lived in rural
areas so that the officers following the suspects in a police car might easily have alerted the
suspects).
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exclusion. If a defendant later wishes to challenge the search, the
defense attorney could subpoena the declaration from the prosecutor’s
office. With access to the declaration, a prosecutor could readily
determine when an officer’s express reasoning for employing GPS
devices is unfounded and dismiss the charges before the suppression
motion, thereby improving judicial economy.
Lastly, when the officer initiates the GPS surveillance, he or she
would be required to attach the device while the vehicle is parked in a
public place, not in the curtilage of the suspect’s home. This procedural
declaration written under penalty of perjury would force the officer to
evaluate the need for GPS and thereby help to confine its usage within
constitutional boundaries. Requiring reasonable suspicion, as opposed to
probable cause, would allow police to utilize the technology during the
early stages of their investigations when they are still gathering evidence
on their suspects.
CONCLUSION
When the Court considers Jones, it must be careful not to deprive
the police of the practical benefits of GPS technology. Requiring
officers to obtain search warrants before utilizing GPS technology to
help them covertly investigate criminal networks would, in many
instances, defeat the purpose of the device. 172 Maynard and PinedaMoreno demonstrated that Supreme Court case law provides inadequate
guidance when it is applied to GPS surveillance operations. 173
“Reasonable Suspicion Plus” would permit law enforcement to utilize
GPS technology only when doing so would help advance a legitimate
purpose, and thus would alleviate fears that officers might abuse the
technology.
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See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. filed
Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 1462758 at *24 (“Although in some investigations the government could
establish probable cause and obtain a warrant before using a GPS device, federal law enforcement
agencies frequently use tracking devices early in investigations, before suspicions have ripened into
probable cause.”) (emphasis added).
173
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing to Knotts, 460 U.S. at
284-85, the 7th Circuit noted “the Court left open the question whether installing the device in the
vehicle converted the subsequent tracking into a search”).
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